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Abstract. Masking is an effective and widely-used countermeasure to
thwart Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks on symmetric crypto-
systems. When a symmetric cipher involves a combination of Boolean
and arithmetic operations, it is necessary to convert the masks from one
form to the other. There exist algorithms for mask conversion that are
secure against first-order attacks, but they can not be generalized to
higher orders. At CHES 2014, Coron, Großscha¨dl and Vadnala (CGV)
introduced a secure conversion scheme between Boolean and arithmetic
masking of any order, but their approach requires d = 2t + 1 shares to
protect against attacks of order t. In the present paper, we improve the
algorithms for second-order conversion with the help of lookup tables so
that only three shares instead of five are needed, which is the minimal
number for second-order resistance. Furthermore, we also improve the
first-order secure addition method proposed by Karroumi, Richard and
Joye, again with lookup tables. We prove the security of all presented
algorithms using well established assumptions and models. Finally, we
provide experimental evidence of our improved mask conversion applied
to HMAC-SHA-1. Simulation results show that our algorithms improve
the execution time by 85% at the expense of little memory overhead.
Keywords: Side-channel analysis (SCA), arithmetic masking, Boolean
masking, provably secure masking, HMAC-SHA-1
1 Introduction
Ever since the introduction of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks in the late
1990s, there has been much interest in finding countermeasures to thwart this
form of “physical cryptanalysis,” in particular the Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) attacks [8]. From a high-level perspective, DPA countermeasures aim to
either randomize the power consumption (which can be done in both the time
and amplitude domain) or make it completely independent from the processed
data. The goal of both approaches is to eliminate (or, at least, reduce) the cor-
relation between the power consumption and the key-dependent intermediate
variables processed during the execution of a cryptographic algorithm. Concrete
examples for randomization in the time domain include various “hiding”-style
countermeasures like the insertion of random delays or shuﬄing of operations
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[9]. On the other hand, a classical example of randomization in the amplitude
domain is masking, which aims to conceal each sensitive intermediate variable
x with a random value x2, called mask [2, 9]. This means that x is represented
by two shares, namely the masked variable x1 = x ⊕ x2 and the mask x2. The
two shares need to be manipulated separately throughout the execution of the
algorithm to ensure that the instantaneous power consumption of the device
does not leak any information about x. A conventional DPA attack may reveal
x1 or x2 (both of which appear as random numbers to the attacker), but the
knowledge of x1 alone or x2 alone does not give the attacker any information
about the sensitive variable x.
One of the major challenges when applying masking to a block cipher is to
implement the round functions in such a way that the shares can be processed
independently from each other, while it still must be possible to recombine them
at the end of the execution to get the correct result. This is fairly easy for all
linear operations, but can introduce massive overheads for the non-linear parts
of a cipher, i.e. the S-boxes. In addition, all round transformations need to be
executed twice (namely for x1 and for x2, where x = x1 ⊕ x2), which entails a
further performance penalty. Another problem is that a basic masking scheme
as described above is vulnerable to a so-called second-order DPA attack where
an attacker combines information from two leakage points (i.e. he exploits the
side-channel leakage originating from x1 and x2 simultaneously [11]). Such a
second-order DPA attack can, in turn, be thwarted by second-order masking, in
which each sensitive variable is concealed with two random masks and, conse-
quently, represented by three shares. In general, a d-th order masking scheme
uses d random masks to split a sensitive intermediate variable into d+ 1 shares
x1, x2, . . . , xd+1 satisfying x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xd+1 = x, which are then processed
independently. In this way, it is guaranteed that the joint leakage of any sub-
set of up to d shares is independent of the secret key. Only a combination of all
d+ 1 shares (i.e. the masked variable x1 = x⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xd+1 and the d masks
x2, . . . , xd+1) is jointly dependent on the sensitive variable. However, given the
presence of noise, the cost for attacking a higher-order masked implementation
increases exponentially with d [2].
Depending on the algorithmic properties of a cipher, a masking scheme can
have to protect Boolean operations (e.g. xors, shifts) or arithmetic operations
(e.g. modular additions). When a cipher involves both Boolean and arithmetic
operations, it is necessary to convert the masks from one form to the other to
obtain the correct ciphertext (or plaintext). Examples of symmetric algorithms
that involve arithmetic as well as Boolean operations include the widely-used
hash functions SHA-1, SHA-2, Blake and Skein, some ARX-based block ciphers
(e.g. XTEA, Threefish) and all four finalists for the eSTREAM software port-
folio. Given the widespread deployment of these cryptosystems in various kinds
of application (including some with a need for sophisticated countermeasures
against DPA), it is important to develop efficient techniques for the conversion
between Boolean and arithmetic masks. However, almost all secure conversion
techniques reported in the literature are only applicable to first-order masking
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[4–7, 10]. Among the few exceptions is the second-order conversion scheme due
to Vadnala and Großscha¨dl [13] and the recent higher-order conversion scheme
by Coron, Großscha¨dl and Vadnala [3]. We outline both schemes below.
Vadnala-Großscha¨dl Scheme [13]. The foundation of this technique is the
generic second-order countermeasure that Rivain, Dottax and Prouff proposed
at FSE 2008 [12]. We recall their algorithm for computing a second-order secure
masked S-box output from a second-order secure masked input below.
Algorithm 1. Sec2O-masking [12]
Input: Three input shares: (x1 = x⊕x2⊕x3, x2, x3) ∈ F2n , two output shares:
(y1, y2) ∈ F2m , and an (n,m) S-box lookup function S
Output: Masked S-box output: S(x)⊕ y1 ⊕ y2
1: r ← Rand(n)
2: r′ ← (r ⊕ x2)⊕ x3
3: for a := 0 to 2n − 1 do
4: a′ ← a⊕ r′
5: T [a′]← ((S(x1 ⊕ a)⊕ y1)⊕ y2)
6: end for
7: return T [r]
In Algorithm 1, a lookup table is generated for all possible values of x. The
index to the lookup table is masked using a random number r. Then, the cor-
rect value of the share is obtained by retrieving the table entry corresponding
to the index r. The main idea here is that the actual computation of the third
arithmetic share is hidden among other dummy calculations for all the possible
values. Since the value of r changes for every iteration, the attacker is not able
to guess the point in time at which the actual value of x is being leaked. The
authors of [12] proved the security of the algorithm by demonstrating that no
pair of intermediate variables leaks any sensitive information.
The goal of a second-order Boolean to arithmetic conversion is to compute
arithmetic shares from a set of Boolean shares without introducing any second
or first-order leakage. In order to achieve second-order DPA resistance, we need
three Boolean shares x1, x2, and x3 so that the sensitive variable x is given as
x = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3. The goal is to find three arithmetic shares A1, A2, A3 satis-
fying x = A1 +A2 +A3 without leaking any first or second-order information
about x. The solution given by Vadnala and Großscha¨dl [13] is to modify the
masked lookup table in Algorithm 1 to store ((x1 ⊕ a) − A2) − A3 instead of a
masked S-box output; the rest of the algorithm is very similar to the original
one. They followed the same approach for arithmetic to Boolean conversion.
Coron-Großscha¨dl-Vadnala Scheme [3]. Recently, Coron, Großscha¨dl and
Vadnala proposed conversion algorithms that are secure against attacks of any
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order [3]. They first proposed a secure solution to add Boolean shares directly
by generalizing Goubin’s recursion formula [6]. Their solution has a complexity
O(d2 · n) to secure against t-th order attacks, where d ≥ 2t+ 1 and n is the size
of the masks. Then, they used this addition as subroutine to derive algorithms
for conversion between Boolean and arithmetic masking, again with complexity
O(d2 · n).
Our Contributions. The generic solution of Coron, Großscha¨dl and Vadnala
[3] requires five shares to protect against second-order attacks, which entails a
significant overhead in terms of the required amount of random numbers and
execution time. Although the algorithms proposed by Vadnala and Großscha¨dl
[13] require only three shares to achieve second-order resistance, they become
infeasible for implementation on low-resource devices (e.g. smart cards) when
n > 10 (the additions are performed modulo 2n), as they require a lookup table
of size 2n.
In the present paper, we propose second-order secure conversion algorithms
that overcome said limitations and can, thus, be easily applied to cryptographic
constructions with arbitrary n, e.g. HMAC-SHA-1 with n = 32. The proposed
algorithms use only three shares and are, therefore, significantly faster than the
state-of-the-art. Our solution follows the basic idea of Vadnala and Großscha¨dl
(which, in turn, is based on work of Rivain, Dottax and Prouff [12]), but uses
a divide and conquer approach to prevent that the lookup tables become pro-
hibitively large. In the case of Boolean to arithmetic conversion, we divide the
Boolean shares into words of l ≤ 8 bits each and then compute the words of the
corresponding arithmetic shares independently in a word-by-word fashion. Part
of this procedure is to handle all the carries propagating from less to more sig-
nificant words, which also need to be protected by masking to prevent any first
or second-order leakage. We show that this can be achieved in an efficient and
secure fashion by using separate lookup tables for the carries. Furthermore, we
prove the security of our conversion schemes in the same model as [12]. Using
similar techniques, we show that the efficiency of the first-order secure masked
addition due to Karroumi, Richard and Joye [7] can be improved as well.
2 Efficient Second-Order Secure Boolean to Arithmetic
Masking
In this section, we give the efficient Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm
secure against attacks of second order. The idea is to split the n-bit shares into
p words (of l bits each) and convert each word independently.
2.1 Boolean to Arithmetic Masking of second-order
We are given three Boolean shares x1, x2, x3 so that the sensitive variable x is
obtained through x = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3. The goal is to find three arithmetic shares
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A1, A2, A3 that satisfy x = A1 +A2 +A3 without leaking any first or second-
order information on x. This can be achieved by generating two shares A2 and
A3 randomly and computing the third share as A1 = x−A2 −A3, as done in
[13] using the approach of Rivain, Dottax and Prouff from [12]. But as stated
earlier, this scheme becomes infeasible for use in practice when n > 10 since it
requires a lookup table of size 2n. To obtain a solution for n > 10, we apply a
divide and conquer approach. That is, we split each share into p words of l bits
each and compute (Ai1)(0≤i≤p−1) independently, where A1 = A
p−1
1 || · · · ||A01. In
this case, we also need to handle the carries propagating from word i to word
i + 1 properly. More precisely, these carries must be protected by masking, as
otherwise they would leak information about the sensitive variable. Below, we
describe our method to protect the sensitive variables along with carries and
demonstrate its security with a formal proof.
We differentiate between two sets of carries: input carries (i.e. carries used
for the computation of Ai1) and output carries (i.e. carries generated while com-
puting Ai1). Since the computation of A
i
1 involves two subtractions, there are
two output carries from each word Ai1, which become input carries for the word
Ai+11 . For the first word A
0
1, the input carries are initialized to 0, i.e. c
0
1 = 0 and
c02 = 0. We compute A
i
1 from the input x
i and carries ci1, c
i
2 as follows:
Ai1 = (x
i −l ci1 −l Ai2 −l ci2 −l Ai3)
An operation of the form a−l b represents a− b mod 2l. Similarly, the output
carries ci+11 , c
i+1
2 are computed as follows:
ci+11 = Carry(x
i, ci1)⊕ Carry(xi −l ci1, Ai2) (1)
ci+12 = Carry(x
i −l ci1 −l Ai2, ci2)⊕ Carry(xi −l ci1 −l Ai2 −l ci2, Ai3) (2)
where Carry(a, b) represents the carry from the subtraction a − b. As specified
by Equation (1) and (2), each carry computation involves two subtractions: one
with the input carry (ci1, c
i
2) and the other with a random share (A
i
2, A
i
3). In
the simplest case, a subtraction a− b produces a carry when a < b. However, in
our scenario, we have operations of the form (a−l c)−l b, whereby a and b are
l-bit integers and c is either 0 or 1. In the case of c = 0, the above operation
generates a carry if a < b. On the other hand, when c = 1, we have to take into
account another case, namely a < c, which can only happen when a = 0 and
c = 1. In this special case, the difference a −l c becomes 2l − 1 and a carry is
generated that needs to be processed as well. However, the second subtraction
can not generate a carry as b ≤ 2l−1. Namely, the carries from these two cases
are mutually exclusive; hence, the output carry is set to 1 when either of them
produces a carry as shown in Equation (1) and (2). For simplicity, we define the
functions F1 : {0, 1}l+1 → {0, 1}l+1 and F2 : {0, 1}2l → {0, 1}l+1 as follows.
F1(a, b) = a−l b || (Carry(a, b)) (3)
F2(a, b) = a−l b || (Carry(a, b)) (4)
For a given word with index i, we can compute Ai1 as well as the output carries
ci+11 , c
i+1
2 using F1 and F2 according to the following equations:
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(Bi1||di1) = F1(xi, ci1)
(Bi2||di2) = F2(Bi1, Ai2)
(Bi3||di3) = F1(Bi2, ci2)
(Bi4||di4) = F2(Bi3, Ai3)
where Ai1 = B
i
4 and c
i+1
1 = d
i
1 ⊕ di2, ci+12 = di3 ⊕ di4. As pointed out in [12], the
S-box in Rivain, Dottax and Prouff’s scheme must be balanced in order to be
secure1. In our case, the function F1 plays the same role and is balanced; con-
sequently, the security guarantee is preserved. We first present non-randomized
version of our solution below for simplicity.
Algorithm 2. Insecure 20B→A
Input: Sensitive variable: x = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3
Output: Arithmetic shares: x = A1 +A2 +A3
1: c01, c
0
2 ← 0 . Initially carry is zero
2: for i := 0 to p− 1 do
3: Ai2, A
i
3 ← Rand(l) . Generate output masks randomly
4: (Bi1, d
i
1)← F1(xi, ci1)
5: (Bi2, d
i
2)← F2(Bi1, Ai2)
6: (Bi3, d
i
3)← F1(Bi2, ci2)
7: (Bi4, d
i
4)← F2(Bi3, Ai3)
8: (Ai1, c
i+1
1 , c
i+1
2 )← (Bi4, di1 ⊕ di2, di3 ⊕ di4)
9: end for
10: return A1, A2, A3
The challenge is to implement Algorithm 2 so that it does not leak any first
or second-order information about the sensitive variable x as well as the carries
ci1, c
i
2 for 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1. We present our solution in two parts: we first give the
algorithm to securely compute the result for one word (namely Ai1), and then
we use this as a “subroutine” to compute A1. Our solution, given in Algorithm
3, employs a similar technique as [12] (recalled in Algorithm 1) in combination
with Algorithm 2. Algorithm 3 expects as input three Boolean shares, six input
carry shares (three each for the two carries), two output arithmetic shares, and
four output carry shares. It returns as result the third arithmetic share and the
remaining two output carry shares. Similar to Algorithm 1, we create a lookup
table T for all the possible values in [0, 2l+2 − 1]. Here, l bits are used to store
Ai1 and two bits for the two carries correspondingly. The rest of the algorithm
is very similar to the original one, except that we have to handle two extra bits
for the carry2.
1 An S-box S : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is said to be balanced if every element in {0, 1}m is
image of exactly 2n−m elements in {0, 1}n under S.
2 We use different tables to store the actual value and the carries so that the security
proof can be easily obtained as in [12].
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Algorithm 3. Sec20B→A Word
Input: Three input shares: (xi1 = x
i ⊕ xi2 ⊕ xi3, xi2, xi3) ∈ F2l , Six input carry shares:
gi1 = c
i
1 ⊕ gi2 ⊕ gi3, gi2, gi3, gi4 = ci2 ⊕ gi5 ⊕ gi6, gi5, gi6 ∈ F2, Output arithmetic shares:
Ai2, A
i
3, Output carry shares: h
i
1, h
i
2, h
i
3, h
i
4
Output: Masked Arithmetic share: (xi −l Ai2)−l Ai3 and masked output carries
1: r1 ← Rand(l); r2 ← Rand(1); r3 ← Rand(1)
2: r′1 ← (r1 ⊕ xi2)⊕ xi3; r′2 ← (r2 ⊕ gi2)⊕ gi3; r′3 ← (r3 ⊕ gi5)⊕ gi6;
3: for a1 := 0 to 2
l − 1, a2 := 0 to 1, a3 := 0 to 1 do
4: a′1 ← a1 ⊕ r′1; a′2 ← a2 ⊕ r′2; a′3 ← a3 ⊕ r′3
5: (Bi1, d
i
1)← F1((xi1 ⊕ a1), (gi1 ⊕ a2))
6: (Bi2, d
i
2)← F2(Bi1, Ai2)
7: (Bi3, d
i
3)← F1(Bi2, (gi4 ⊕ a3))
8: (Bi4, d
i
4)← F2(Bi3, Ai3)
9: ei1 ← ((di1 ⊕ hi1)⊕ di2)⊕ hi2
10: ei2 ← ((di3 ⊕ hi3)⊕ di4)⊕ hi4
11: (T1[a
′
1||a′2||a′3], T2[a′1||a′2||a′3], T3[a′1||a′2||a′3])← (Bi4, ei1, ei2)
12: end for
13: return T1[r1||r2||r3], T2[r1||r2||r3], T3[r1||r2||r3]
Finally, we give our second-order secure technique to obtain three arithmetic
shares corresponding to the three Boolean shares in Algorithm 4. For the first
word (i.e. i = 0), there are no input carries and, consequently, the three shares
for both carries are set to zero (Step 1), i.e. we have g01 = g
0
2 = g
0
3 = c
0
1 = 0 and
g04 = g
0
5 = g
0
6 = c
0
2 = 0. To protect the output carries, we use four uniformly
generated random bits: hi1, h
i
2, h
i
3, h
i
4; two each for the two carries. The third
share for the carries as well as Ai1 are computed recursively using the function
Sec20B→A Word (Algorithm 3)3. Note that for word i, gi1 ⊕ gi2 ⊕ gi3 = ci1 and
gi4 ⊕ gi5 ⊕ gi6 = ci2. The time complexity of the overall solution is O(2l+2 · p) and
the memory requirements amount to (2l+2 · (l + 2)) bits.
Algorithm 4. Sec20B→A
Input: Boolean shares: x1 = x⊕ x2 ⊕ x3, x2, x3
Output: Arithmetic shares: A1, A2, A3 so that x = A1 +A2 +A3
1: g01 , g
0
2 , g
0
3 , g
0
4 , g
0
5 , g
0
6 ← 0 . Initially carry is zero
2: for i := 0 to p− 1 do
3: Ai2, A
i
3 ← Rand(l) . Generate output masks randomly
4: hi1, h
i
2, h
i
3, h
i
4 ← Rand(1)
5: (Ai1, g
i+1
1 , g
i+1
4 )← Sec20B→A Word ((xij)1≤j≤3, (gij)1≤j≤6, Ai2, Ai3, (hij)1≤j≤4)
6: gi+12 , g
i+1
3 , g
i+1
5 , g
i+1
6 ← hi1, hi2, hi3, hi4
7: end for
8: return A1, A2, A3
3 Every call to the function Sec20B→A Word creates a new table and is useful for that
particular word only. Hence, unlike the original method in [12], we do not reuse the
table.
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2.2 Security Analysis
For an algorithm to be secure against second-order DPA attacks, no pair of in-
termediate variables appearing in the algorithm should jointly leak the sensitive
variable. In [12], the authors prove the security by enumerating all the possible
pairs of intermediate variables and showing that the joint distribution of none
of these pairs is dependent on the distribution of the sensitive variable. We use
a similar method to prove the security of Algorithm 3. Thereafter, we prove the
security of Algorithm 4 through induction.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 3 is secure against second-order DPA.
Proof. We list all intermediate variables used in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3
in Table 1. The intermediate variables computed through a similar technique
appear in the same row. The only difference is that we have three intermediate
variables instead of one for each row4. Hence, the security of Algorithm 3 can
be derived from the same arguments as in the case of Algorithm 1.
Table 1. Comparison of intermediate variables used in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3
Intermediate variables in Intermediate variables in
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 3
x2 x
i
2, g
i
2, g
i
5
x3 x
i
3, g
i
3, g
i
6
y1 A
i
2, h
i
1, h
i
3
y2 A
i
3, h
i
2, h
i
4
r r1, r2, r3
x2 ⊕ r xi2 ⊕ r1, gi2 ⊕ r2, gi5 ⊕ r3
x2 ⊕ r ⊕ x3 xi2 ⊕ r1 ⊕ xi3, gi2 ⊕ r2 ⊕ gi3, gi5 ⊕ r3 ⊕ gi5
a a1, a2, a3
a⊕ r ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 a1 ⊕ r′1, a2 ⊕ r′2, a3 ⊕ r′3
x1 = x⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 xi1 = xi ⊕ xi2 ⊕ xi3, gi1 = ci1 ⊕ gi2 ⊕ gi3, gi4 = ci2 ⊕ gi3 ⊕ gi6
x1 ⊕ a xi1 ⊕ a, gi1 ⊕ a2, gi4 ⊕ a3
S(x1 ⊕ a) (Bi1||di1) = F1((xi1 ⊕ a), gi1 ⊕ a2)
(Bi3||di3) = F1((xi1 ⊕ a)−l gi1 ⊕ a2 −l Ai2, gi4 ⊕ a3)
di2 = Carry((x
i
1 ⊕ a)−l (gi1 ⊕ a2), Ai2)
di4 = Carry((x
i
1 ⊕ a)−l (gi1 ⊕ a2)−l Ai2 −l (gi4 ⊕ a3), Ai3)
S(x1 ⊕ a)⊕ y1 Bi2 = (xi1 ⊕ a)−l (gi1 ⊕ a2)−l Ai2,
di1 ⊕ hi1 ⊕ di2, di3 ⊕ hi3 ⊕ di4
S(x1 ⊕ a)⊕ y1 ⊕ y2 Bi4 = (xi1 ⊕ a)−l (gi1 ⊕ a2)−l Ai2 −l (gi4 ⊕ a3)−l Ai3,
di1 ⊕ hi1 ⊕ di2 ⊕ hi2, di3 ⊕ hi3 ⊕ di4 ⊕ hi4
S(x)⊕ y1 ⊕ y2 xi −l ci1 −l Ai2 −l ci2 −l Ai3,
ci+11 ⊕ hi1 ⊕ hi2, ci+12 ⊕ hi3 ⊕ hi4
Theorem 1. Algorithm 4 is secure against second-order DPA.
Proof. To prove the security of Algorithm 4, we apply mathematical induction
on the number of words p. When p = 1, we already know that the algorithm is
4 The only exception is for the row S(x1 ⊕ a), where we have four variables.
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secure due to the proof of Lemma 1. Now, assume that the algorithm is secure
for p = n. Let Ei be the set that represents the collection of all intermediate
variables corresponding to the word i. Then, by the induction hypothesis, the
set {E1, · · ·En}×{E1, · · ·En} is independent of the sensitive variables x, c1 and
c2. For the algorithm to be secure when p = n+ 1, the set {E1, · · ·En, En+1} ×
{E1, · · ·En, En+1} should be independent of the sensitive variables x, c1 and
c2. Without loss of generality, we divide this set into three subsets as follows:
{En+1 × En+1}, {E1, · · ·En} × {E1, · · ·En}, and {En+1} × {E1, · · ·En}. The
security of {En+1 × En+1} can be established directly from the base case, and
the security of {E1, · · ·En}×{E1, · · ·En} follows from the induction hypothesis
(see above). All the intermediate variables in En+1 fall into two categories: (i)
the variables that are generated randomly and are independent of any variables
in {E1, · · ·En}, and (ii) the variables that are a function of one or more of the
following: xn+1, cn+11 , c
n+1
2 . Any pair of intermediate variables involving the
former category is independent of the sensitive variables by definition and the
first-order resistance of the set {E1, · · ·En}. The two carry shares for the word
n + 1, namely (cn+1i )1≤i≤2, are computed from the word n. Thus, the security
of (cn+1i )1≤i≤3×{E1, · · ·En} is already established in {En}× {E1, · · ·En}. One
can easy see that the set (xn+1) × {E1, · · ·En} is independent of any sensitive
variable. Hence, the set {En+1} × {E1, · · ·En} is also independent of any sen-
sitive variable, which proves the theorem.
3 Efficient Second-Order Secure Arithmetic to Boolean
Masking
In arithmetic to Boolean conversion, the problem is to find three shares x1, x2
and x3 satisfying x = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3, where the sensitive variable x is represented
by three arithmetic shares A1, A2, A3 with x = A1 + A2 + A3. To tackle this
problem, we follow the same strategy as in Section 2.1. We first generate two
Boolean shares x2 and x3 randomly, and compute the third share by using the
relation x1 = ((A1 + A2 + A3) ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3), without leaking the value of x in a
first or second-order DPA. To achieve this, we take the following approach: we
firstly obtain a method to convert a single arithmetic share-word, and then we
employ this procedure recursively to all words. For each word, we have to deal
with two carries corresponding to the two additions, namely the carry from the
addition of the two shares corresponding to A2, A3 and its subsequent addition
with A1. Our solution is described in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 5 provides our solution for converting one word of Boolean shares
to corresponding arithmetic shares. We again use the technique from Algorithm
1 as in Algorithm 3. Since the input shares here are masked using arithmetic
masking instead of Boolean masking, we have to modify the operations accord-
ingly. Hence, the computation of r′1 (in Step 2) and a
′
1 (in Step 5) are replaced
with additive operations. However, we can still mask the carries using Boolean
masking as previously and, hence, the corresponding operations do not change
(Step 3, Step 7). We create a table for all possible values in [0, 2l+2 − 1], where
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Algorithm 5. Sec20A→B Word
Input: Three input shares: (Ai1 = (x
i−Ai2)−Ai3, Ai2, Ai3) ∈ F2l , Six input carry shares:
gi1 = c
i
1 ⊕ gi2 ⊕ gi3, gi2, gi3, gi4 = ci2 ⊕ gi5 ⊕ gi6, gi5, gi6 ∈ F2, Output Boolean shares:
xi2, x
i
3, Output carry shares: h
i
1, h
i
2, h
i
3, h
i
4
Output: Third Boolean share: xi1 = x
i ⊕ xi2 ⊕ xi3 and masked output carries
1: r1 ← Rand(l); r2 ← Rand(1); r3 ← Rand(1)
2: r′1 ← (Ai2 − r1) +Ai3 . Mask two arithmetic shares
3: r′2 ← (r2 ⊕ gi2)⊕ gi3; r′3 ← (r3 ⊕ gi5)⊕ gi6
4: for a1 := 0 to 2
l − 1 do
5: a′1 ← a1 −l r′1 . a′1 = r1 =⇒ a = Ai2 +Ai3
6: for a2 := 0 to 1, a3 := 0 to 1 do
7: a′2 ← a2 ⊕ r′2; a′3 ← a3 ⊕ r′3
8: (Bi1||di2)← F3(Ai1 + a3 + (a2 +l a1))
9: di1 ← Carry(a1, r′1)⊕ Carry(a1,−a2)
10: xi1 ← (B1 ⊕ xi2)⊕ xi3 . Apply Boolean masking to the result
11: ei1 ← (di1 ⊕ hi1)⊕ hi2 . Apply masking to the carries
12: ei2 ← (di2 ⊕ hi3)⊕ hi4
13: T1[a
′
1||a′2||a′3], T2[a′1||a′2||a′3], T3[a′1||a′2||a′3]← (xi1, ei1, ei2)
14: end for
15: end for
16: return T1[r1||r2||r3], T2[r1||r2||r3], T3[r1||r2||r3]
l bits are used for xi1 and the two extra bits for carries. From a
′
1 = a1 −l r′1, we
have a1 = a
′
1 +l r
′
1. However, a1 − r′1 could generate a carry, which needs to be
taken care of while computing xi1. Hence, we compute the value of a1 as a1 =
(a′1 +l r
′
1 +l a2), whereby a2 is the carry from the previous word. This ensures
that, for a′1 = r1, we have:
a1 = (r1 +l ((A
i
2 − r1) +Ai3) +l a2) = Ai2 +Ai3
The output carry di1 (which becomes a2 for the next word) can occur in two
scenarios: when a1 < r
′
1 or when (a1 + a2) ≥ 2l (Step 9). It is easy to see that
these two cases are mutually exclusive. Now, to compute xi1, we use a function
F3 : {0, 1}l+1 → {0, 1}l+1, which is defined as:
F3(a) = a mod 2
l ||Carry(2l, a)
We call F3 with (A
i
1 + a3 + (a2 +l a1)), where a3 represents the second carry. In
this case, the first part returned by F3 gives x
i. The second part corresponds to
the second carry, which becomes a3 in the next word
5. Namely, when a′1 = r1,
F3(A
i
1 + a3 + (a2 +l a1)) = (A
i
1 + a3 + (a2 +l a1)) mod 2
l ||
Carry(2l, (Ai1 + a3 + (a2 +l a1))) = (x
i + a3) mod 2
l ||Carry(2l, (xi + a3))
5 Note that, even though xi and the carries are computed in clear, they are hidden
amongst 2l+2 − 1 dummy computations, which is the basis for the security of the
original algorithm of Rivain, Dottax and Prouff [12].
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Once we have xi and the carries di1, d
i
2, we can simply apply boolean masks on
them to obtain xi1 and the masked carries (in Step 10, 11 and 12). Finally, we
specify the full solution for conversion from arithmetic to Boolean masking in
Algorithm 6. It is similar to Algorithm 4, except that the Boolean shares and
arithmetic shares are interchanged.
Algorithm 6. Sec20A→B
Input: Arithmetic shares: A1 = x−A2 −A3, A2, A3
Output: Boolean shares: x1, x2, x3 so that x = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3
1: g01 , g
0
2 , g
0
3 , g
0
4 , g
0
5 , g
0
6 ← 0 . Initially carry is zero
2: for i := 0 to p− 1 do
3: xi2, x
i
3 ← Rand(l) . Generate output masks randomly
4: hi1, h
i
2, h
i
3, h
i
4 ← Rand(1)
5: (xi1, g
i+1
1 , g
i+1
4 )← Sec20A→B Word ((Aij)1≤j≤3, (gij)1≤j≤6, xi2, xi3, (hij)1≤j≤4)
6: gi+12 , g
i+1
3 , g
i+1
5 , g
i+1
6 ← hi1, hi2, hi3, hi4
7: end for
8: return x1, x2, x3
Theorem 2. Algorithm 6 is secure against second-order DPA.
Proof. The proof of Algorithm 6 can be obtained similar to Algorithm 4 and is
omitted.
4 Efficient First-Order Secure Masked Addition
This paper considers the general problem of dealing with arithmetic operations
on Boolean masks. Till now, we solved this problem by converting the Boolean
masks to arithmetic masks. The basic idea is that, once we have the arithmetic
masks, we can perform any arithmetic operation directly and then convert the
result back to Boolean masks. But there also exists an alternative approach to
the original problem, namely to perform an arithmetic operation (e.g. addition)
directly on Boolean masks. This idea was first studied for first-order masking in
[1] and then detailed in [7]. In this section, we provide a more efficient method
using lookup tables based on the conversion technique by Debraize [5].
The problem here can be described as follows: we are given Boolean shares
of two n-bit sensitive variables x: x1, r and y: y1, s. We need to compute z1 so
that z1 ⊕ r ⊕ s = x + y, without any first-order leakage of x and y. To achieve
this, we follow the same divide-and-conquer strategy we used in Section 2 and
Section 3. Namely, we divide n-bit shares into p words of l-bit each and perform
addition on the words independently. Furthermore, our method also masks the
carry from word i to word i + 1. The addition of each word is carried out with
the help of a lookup table, which can be reused for all the words6.
6 We use different tables in the case of second-order masking, but we can re-use the
table for first-order masking.
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Our method to generate the lookup table is given in Algorithm 7. It creates
a table with 22l+1 entries, each requiring l + 1 bit of memory. Here, 2l bits are
used for two l-bit inputs xi, yi and one bit for the input carry. The output con-
sists of l-bit zi and one bit carry. We run through all the possible 22l+1 values
and store the masked value of sum and carry in the lookup table. Note that the
inputs masks are t1, t2 and ρ (carry), and out masks are t1 and ρ (carry).
Algorithm 7. GenTable
Input:
Output: Table T , t1, t2, ρ
1: t1, t2 ← Rand(l); ρ← Rand(1)
2: for A = 0 to 2l − 1 do
3: for B = 0 to 2l − 1 do
4: T [ρ||A||B]← ((A⊕ t1) + (B ⊕ t2))⊕ (ρ||t1)
5: T [ρ⊕ 1||A||B]← ((A⊕ t1) + (B ⊕ t2) + 1)⊕ (ρ||t1)
6: end for
7: end for
8: return T, t1, t2, ρ
The full technique to compute addition on Boolean shares is given in Algo-
rithm 8. Initially, the carry is zero, which is masked with the carry mask ρ from
Algorithm 7. We distinguish between carry and no-carry cases as follows: when
β = ρ, then there is no carry; otherwise, β = ρ⊕ 1. Before accessing the lookup
table, we change the input masks to t1 and t2 (step 3, 4). After we obtain the
masked sum, we change the mask back to ri ⊕ si from t1 (step 6). Finally, the
output can be obtained as z1 = z
p−1
1 || · · · ||z01 = (x+ y)⊕ r ⊕ s.
Algorithm 8. Sec10A
Input: x1 = x⊕ r, r, y1 = y ⊕ s, s, T, t1, t2, ρ
Output: z1 = (x+ y)⊕ r ⊕ s
1: β ← ρ
2: for i = 0 to p− 1 do
3: xi1 ← xi1 ⊕ t1 ⊕ ri
4: yi1 ← yi1 ⊕ t2 ⊕ si
5: (β||zi1)← T [β||xi1||yi1]
6: zi1 ← (zi1 ⊕ ri ⊕ si)⊕ (t1)
7: end for
8: return z1
Lemma 2. Algorithm 8 is secure against first-order DPA.
Proof. It is easy to see that the distribution of all the intermediate variables in
Algorithm 8 is independent of the sensitive variables x and y. Consequently, the
proof is straightforward.
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5 Implementation Results
We implemented all the proposed algorithms in ANSI C and executed them on
a 32-bit ARM microcontroller. The results are summarized in Table 2. We used
three different word sizes (namely ` = 1, 2, 4) for the second-order conversion
algorithm and a word size of ` = 4 for first-order masked addition7. In order to
compare our results with that of existing techniques, we also implemented the
Coron-Großscha¨dl-Vadnala (CGV) method [3] for second-order conversion and
the Karroumi-Richard-Joye (KRJ) method [7] for first-order secure addition. As
expected, the improvement in case of the second-order conversion algorithms is
significant due to the reduction of the number of shares from five to three. We
notice that the conversion algorithms perform best when ` = 2. Our Boolean to
arithmetic conversion algorithm with negligible memory requirements (between
8 and 64 bytes) is some 86% faster than the CGV method. Similarly, our arith-
metic to Boolean conversion algorithm improves the running time by 83%, with
equivalent memory footprint. On the other hand, we improve the performance
of the first-order algorithms by roughly 20%.
Table 2. Implementation results for n = 32 on a 32-bit microcontroller. The column
Time specifies the running time in clock cycles, rand gives the number of calls to the
random number generator function, while column ` and Memory refer to the word size
and memory (in bytes) required for the table-based algorithms.
Algorithm ` Time Memory rand
second-order conversion
Algorithm 4 1 12186 8 226
Algorithm 4 2 11030 16 114
Algorithm 4 4 19244 64 58
Algorithm 6 1 10557 8 226
Algorithm 6 2 9059 16 114
Algorithm 6 4 15370 64 58
CGV A→ B [3] - 54060 - 484
CGV B → A [3] - 81005 - 822
first-order addition
KRJ addition [7] - 371 - 1
Algorithm 8 4 294 512 3
To study the implications of our new techniques in practice, we applied them
to secure HMAC-SHA-1. The achieved results are summarized in Table 3. We
can see that, in the best case scenario (i.e. ` = 2), our new algorithms perform
85% better than the existing approaches. In the case of first-order masking, the
improvement amounts to roughly 6%, taking into account the pre-computation
time spent on the generation of the table.
7 We observed that, for ` < 4, the algorithm from [7] performs better than ours.
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Table 3. Running time (in thousands of clock cycles) and penalty factor compared to
the unmasked HMAC-SHA-1 implementation
Algorithm ` Time PF
HMAC-SHA-1 - 104 1
second-order conversion
Algorithm 4, 6 1 9715 95
Algorithm 4, 6 2 8917 85
Algorithm 4, 6 4 15329 147
CGV [3] - 62051 596
first-order addition
KRJ addition [7] - 328 3.1
Algorithm 8 4 308 2.9
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented new time-memory trade-off solutions for conversion
between Boolean and arithmetic masking for first and second order. In the case
of second-order conversion, we reduced the number of required shares from five
to three compared to the CGV method. We demonstrated that, with negligible
memory consumption (up to 64 bytes), we can improve the performance of the
existing algorithms by up to 85%.
An open research problem is to find a way to perform additions on Boolean
shares directly that is secure against attacks of second order. We can not apply
the generic method of [12] in this case since the S-box is not balanced. Such an
S-box would require an input of size 2l + 1 bits (i.e. l bits for each of the two
arguments to add and one bit for input carry) and output the (l + 1)-bit sum
including the carry. For this function to be balanced, each of the 2l+1 possible
outputs must be an image of exactly 2l elements. However, this is not the case
and, consequently, a second-order attack can be mounted. Finding a solution to
this problem could further improve the efficiency of second-order masking.
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